LOOKING BACKWARD FROM THE YEAR 2099: ECOZOIC REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE
Samuel Alexander1
It's all a question of story. We are in trouble just now because we . . .
are in between stories. The old story, the account of how the world came to be
and how we fit into it, . . . sustained us for a long period of time. It shaped our
emotional attitudes, provided us with life purposes, and energized action. It
consecrated suffering and integrated knowledge. We awoke in the morning
and knew where we were. We could answer the questions of our children. . . .
[But now the old story] is no longer effective. Yet we have not learned the
new story.
Thomas Berry2
Thomas Berry was a visionary. He told new stories about the Universe and our place
in it, stories not only about where we have been and where we seem to be going, but also
stories about where we could go, if only we exercised our freedom in different ways.3 Indeed,
story, myth, and narrative played a central role in Berry’s thinking, as the epigraph to this
essay indicates.
Every individual life and every society is an enactment of a story people tell
themselves about the nature and purpose of their existence and of the world they live in.
These stories shape our experiences and guide our thoughts and actions—for better or for
worse, consciously or unconsciously. Needless to say, Berry was deeply troubled by the
dominant story of our times. Put simply, he felt it was a story of Earth as a limitless resource
to be exploited for human gratification, a story which not only degraded the integrity of our
living planet but also promoted a materialistic attitude to life by equating happiness and
well-being with increased opportunities to accumulate and consume. Berry tried to provoke
us into reconsidering this story. He tried to unsettle and inspire us, by telling new stories. As
one of its defining features, Berry’s Earth scholarship is a reminder of the significance of
story.4
For this symposium, rather than offering a close reading of Berry’s writings in Earth
Jurisprudence, I have dared to experiment with story, inspired by those writings. Due to the
unconventional nature of my undertaking, I have avoided direct reference to Berry’s writings,
but the influence of those writings should be clear, everywhere lying just beneath the surface.
In an attempt to build upon Berry’s Earth scholarship and contribute in some modest way to
the Great Work, I will tell a story of the future, a possible future that was conceived of in
between the poles of pessimism and optimism but which is ultimately based upon a faith in
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the human spirit to meet the challenges of creating an Ecozoic era.5 Though I cannot be sure
Berry would have agreed with all the conclusions drawn or speculations made, I believe he
would have been sympathetic to my general undertaking.
What follows is an attempt to look back on the 21st Century from the vantage point of
the year 2099.6 It takes the form of an essay, entitled The Path to Entropia, written for the
journal Possibility by Lennox Kingston, a 90-year-old, retired Professor of Legal and
Political History.7 Motivated by various themes in Earth Jurisprudence, the essay reviews
how attitudes toward consumption and economic growth underwent a radical shift over the
course of the 21st Century and how this affected, through legal reform, the social, political,
and economic order of late capitalism. Particular attention is given to the legal evolution of
property rights and the cultural movements that made this evolution possible. Whether the
changes described are a cause or effect of a shift in human consciousness in relation to Earth
is a question that I leave open for future reflection.8
I dedicate this experimental story to the memory of Thomas Berry.
THE PATH TO ENTROPIA
Lennox Kingston
81 Possibility 9 (2099)
I. PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE
The Ecozoic Movements, which emerged with loud warnings in the final decades of
20th Century and which promised so much in the early decades of 21st Century,9 ultimately
failed to prevent corporate profiteers and the consumer class from having a devastating and
irreversible impact on global ecosystems and biodiversity. Scientists, who used to categorize
geological ages into periods of millions of years, now commonly use the term
―Anthropocene‖ to refer to the last three hundred years only. During this geological blink-ofan-eye, human economic activity violently degraded the planet in many ways, including
pervasive deforestation and the mass extinction of species, climate destabilization, soil
erosion, ocean acidification and depletion, and the near exhaustion of many non-renewable
resources, most notably, oil. 10 Though recent decades of sustained and dedicated
commitment to the Great Restoration seem to have stabilized the biosphere and lessened the
threat of ecosystemic collapse, our world has changed and there is no going back. History
will never forget that fateful day in 2061 when nine billion people watched their television
5
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screens in silence as the last fragments of the polar ice cap melted away forever, stamping our
age with a new image of Earth. It was in 1968 when the Apollo spaceship first captured
those iconic pictures of our fragile planet floating mysteriously through the dark heavens of
outer space. Fewer than one hundred years later human beings had altered that cosmological
scene.
We need not review here the catastrophic effect rising sea levels had on the lives of
millions of environmental refugees, to say nothing of the other humanitarian crises, including
the Water Wars, which were also causally linked to climate change. Nor is there any need to
contribute a word further to the massive literature on the breakdown of global economic
institutions during the Lost Years of 2031-34, from which the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank, and most transnational corporations never recovered. We know about these
tragic, destabilizing events all too well. But as the 21st Century draws to a hesitant close—
not with a bang but with a sigh of relief—there may be some value in looking back on our
long, uncertain, and painful recovery from these events, if only so that we may better
understand the present as we look to the future. It is a recovery which we must attribute
primarily to all those in the Ecozoic Movements who, despite repeated, harrowing
disappointments, kept fighting tirelessly for the cause they knew to be just.
II. THE RISE AND DEMISE OF GROWTH ECONOMICS
For most of human history—romantic myths aside—the vast majority of human
beings lived lives oppressed by material deprivation and insecurity.11 Generally speaking,
human existence was an ongoing struggle for little more than bare subsistence, and for
several millennia the standard of living of the average person in civilized centers did not rise
significantly. 12 But then, in 1712, the steam engine was invented and the First Industrial
Revolution was set into motion. Suddenly the energy stored in the planet’s fossilized fuels
was released in an explosion of mechanized economic activity. The result was that the
wealth of nations—primarily Western nations, at least at first—began to grow at exponential
rates that previous generations would not have thought possible.13
Within those nations that progressed from circumstances of widespread poverty to
circumstances of moderate or comfortable material security, the human lot seemed to
improve considerably.14 Although there were always costs, sometimes great costs, associated
with economic growth—e.g., factory labor, pollution, deforestation, social dislocation, and so
on—for many years these costs were generally outweighed, in terms of human well-being, at
least, by the huge material benefits that resulted. 15 This initial success led to the
entrenchment of what political and economic historians now refer to as ―the growth model of
progress.‖
Put simply, the growth model assumed that the overall well-being of a society was
approximately proportional to the size of its economy, because more money or higher Gross
11
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Domestic Product (GDP) meant that more individual or social ―preferences‖ could be
satisfied via market transactions. 16 No matter how rich a society became, growing the
economy was thought to be the only effective way to eliminate poverty, reduce inequality and
unemployment, properly fund schools, hospitals, the arts, scientific research, environmental
protection programs, and so on. In other words, the underlying social problem (even within
the richest nations) was believed to be a lack of money, and thus for more than two centuries
economic growth was heralded across the political spectrum as the goal toward which
societies should direct their collective energy. The notion of a macroeconomic ―optimal
scale‖ was all but unthinkable. It was assumed that a bigger economy was always better.17
This growth model of progress, as we now know, turned out to be dangerously flawed,
although dislodging it from the social imagination proved exceedingly difficult. John Stuart
Mill, writing in 1848, was one of the first to point out that the costs of economic growth may
one day outweigh the benefits, at which time, he argued, the most appropriate form of
government would be ―the stationary state.‖18 By this he meant a condition of zero growth in
population and physical capital stock, but with continued improvement in technology and in
what he called ―the Art of Living.‖19 This aspect of his oeuvre, however—today his most
famous—was either ignored or summarily dismissed by his contemporaries, and for several
generations it lay forgotten in the intellectual dustbin. Growth scepticism was revived and
updated in the late 1960s by the economist Ezra Mishan,20 and developed further in the 1970s
and beyond by Donella Meadows,21 Ernst Schumacher,22 Herman Daly,23 and Fred Hirsch,24
among many others.25 But although these theorists attained a certain short-lived notoriety
within the intelligentsia and certain counter-cultures, for a long time their work had no
significant political impact at all. Economic growth remained the overriding objective of
governments across the globe.26
16
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In the late 20th Century and early 21st Century, as the costs of economic growth
became more pronounced and harder to tolerate, the undercurrent of growth scepticism
slowly strengthened and began entering the intellectual mainstream. 27 Many rigorous and
credible sociological studies showed that, from about the 1970s onward, economic growth in
most Western societies had stopped contributing significantly to human well-being.28 That is,
it became apparent that a rise in material ―standard of living‖ (measured by per capita income)
was no longer strongly correlated with ―quality of life‖ (measured by subjective wellbeing).29 Indeed, economic growth had even begun undermining many of the things upon
which well-being depended, such as responsive democratic institutions, social solidarity,
spiritual and aesthetic experience, and stable, functioning ecosystems. 30 The clear
implication of these findings was that economic growth should no longer be the primary
measure of policy and institutional success within Western societies.31 But, again, the impact
of this scholarship was very limited, at least for a time. Corporate interests ensured that
growth economics remained firmly entrenched in the political realm, and well into the 21st
Century the reigning orthodoxy was that the answer to almost every problem—including
environmental problems—was more economic growth.32
Below we will review the broad legal and political reforms that eventually helped free
the world from this growth fetish. Before doing so, however, we should direct our attention
to the cultural movements that put those reforms on the political agenda and which were the
driving force behind their implementation. Admittedly, this inquiry is bound to oversimplify
the catalysts of change, because the extensive institutional restructuring which occurred over
the 21st Century doubtless had an infinite array of causes. Nevertheless, historians generally
accept that within Western societies, at least, there were two causes of particular significance:
the first being a destabilizing but ultimately productive disillusionment with ―top-down‖
politics; the second being a radical transformation in attitudes toward personal consumption.
Let us briefly consider these matters in turn.
The onset of chronic disillusionment with ―top-down‖ or ―representative‖ politics is
typically traced back to the years 2007-09. During these years there were two events of
global significance which tested the capacity of democratic systems to function for the
27

See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, AMARTYA SEN & JEAN-PAUL FITOUSSI, MIS-MEASURING OUR LIVES: WHY
GDP DOESN’T ADD UP (2010). See also Beyond GDP, About Beyond GDP, http://www.beyond-gdp.eu (last
visited Feb. 18, 2011) (providing information on developing ―indicators to assess social, economic, and
environmental progress‖ beyond one-dimensional economic indicators).
28
See INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WELL-BEING (Ed Diener, John G. Helliwell & Daniel Kahneman
eds., 2010); see also RICHARD A. EASTERLIN, HAPPINESS, GROWTH AND THE LIFE CYCLE (Holger Hinte & Klaus
F. Zimmerman eds., 2010); JOHN TALBERTH, CLIFFORD COBB & NOAH SLATTERY, THE GENUINE PROGRESS
INDICATOR 2006: A TOOL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2006), available at http://www.environmentalexpert.com/Files%5C24200%5Carticles%5C12128%5CGPI202006.pdf (last visited June 28, 2011).
29
See Ed Diener & Martin E.P. Seligman, Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Well-Being, 5
PSYCHOL.
SCI.
PUB.
INT.
1
(2004),
available
at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.134.3462 (reviewing over 150 studies assessing the
correlation between financial wealth and well-being). See also ROBERT E. LANE, THE LOSS OF HAPPINESS IN
MARKET DEMOCRACIES (2001); TIM KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF MATERIALISM (2002); RICHARD LAYARD,
HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE (2005); BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND
ECONOMICS: HOW THE ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT HUMAN WELL-BEING (2002); INTERNATIONAL
DIFFERENCES IN WELL-BEING, supra note 28.
30
See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. See also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); DAVID G. MYERS, THE AMERICAN PARADOX:
SPIRITUAL HUNGER IN AN AGE OF PLENTY (2000).
31
VICTOR, supra note 25.
32
See, e.g., GEORGE A. GONZALEZ, CORPORATE POWER AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2001).

29

Summer 2011

Looking Backward From the Year 2099

common good. The first was the ―Global Financial Crisis‖ (GFC); the second was the United
Nations Climate Change Conference held in Copenhagen, Denmark.
The GFC had its roots in the so-called ―credit crunch‖ of July 2007, when a loss of
confidence by U.S. investors in the value of sub-prime mortgages caused a liquidity crisis.33
Due to unscrupulous lending by several mega-banks—a process which had been
insufficiently regulated and, indeed, had been systematically encouraged—a huge number of
homeowners in the United States found that they were unable to meet their mortgage
repayments. But when the housing market crashed, banks found that the repossessed houses
and land were worth less than what the bank had originally loaned out. This resulted in the
liquidity crisis. The consequence was that it became increasingly difficult to obtain loans,
investments dried up, and consumer confidence was shattered, all of which ended up having
hugely negative impacts on the global economy.34 Moreover, many of the mega-banks were
on the brink of collapse. Because those banks were ―too big to fail,‖35 however, governments
were essentially forced to bail out the very institutions which caused the crisis in the first
place. This approach proved to be efficacious, in the sense, at least, that over the next two
years the global economy slowly recovered, not without great hardship to many millions of
people. But as ―business as usual‖ resumed, there was the deeply troubling sense that
nothing of any significance had been done to rein in the vast powers of privately owned
financial institutions or to protect people from history repeating itself.36 In short, Western
governments of the time proved to be either impotent in the face of corporate power or
unwilling to confront it.
Much the same can be said of the pivotal Climate Change Conference held in
Copenhagen during December 2009. By this stage the state of scientific research meant that
it was no longer credible to deny the reality of climate change or to deny the potentially
catastrophic consequences 37 —later realized, of course—of failing to significantly reduce
global carbon emissions without delay. Despite the clarity and force of the scientific
warnings, however, the Copenhagen conference lacked any real sense of urgency and was
considered a despairing failure both by and for the Ecozoic Movements. Eventually a weak,
non-binding Emissions Trading Scheme was agreed to, heralded by some as the salvation of
Earth, but the very method of trying to use market mechanisms to solve a problem essentially
caused by markets was doomed to failure—and fail it did. Looking back we see that
Copenhagen was a great crossroad for humanity, a final opportunity to take climate change
seriously. Vested interests in the economic status quo, however, were able to keep growth
capitalism firmly on track, leading not to a decline but, for too many years, a continued rise in
emissions.
Whether it was due to impotence, incompetence, or sheer unwillingness to face the
facts, it must be said that at Copenhagen the political response to the ecological crisis—the
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response from the Western nations, in particular—was a profound dereliction of duty.38 Not
only that, its short-sightedness was economically irrational, because the financial costs of
taking genuine preventative action at that stage would have paled in comparison to the costs
of what lay ahead.39 At this time democratic rule may still have been ―of the people,‖ but
there was a growing suspicion that it was no longer ―by the people‖ or ―for the people.‖
And so it was that Western citizenries began to lose faith, as never before, in
representative democracy. The most significant political decisions of the age were widely
perceived to be dishonourable capitulations before corporate power. Furthermore, the ballot
box seemed to provide no avenue for redress, because it was understood to merely offer the
choice between two or three essentially corporate parties.
In such destabilizing
circumstances, one of two things tends to happen: either democratic subjects violently
overthrow the unrepresentative government, or those subjects take government into their own
hands at the local level. For several years, as the collective rumbling grew to a crescendo,
political commentators were unsure which course of action would prevail, and some even
voiced their concerns about the prospect of wholesale collapse of democratic processes and
the rise of fascist or totalitarian politics in the West. More pessimistically still, others
predicted the collapse of human civilization itself.40
But rather than a violent revolutionary movement, what in fact emerged was a highlyagitated (though inspired), grass-roots democratic culture based on local participation,
community activism, and personal responsibility. 41 Though the essential structure of
representative democracy remained in place, how it functioned changed in almost
unrecognizable ways. Most notably, the Local Life Networks and the Online Referenda
which today structure government so effectively, and which are able to instruct Members of
Parliament so precisely and efficiently, would have been considered utopian dreams not so
long ago. Leaving the details aside, however, our present point is simply that the
disillusionment with ―top-down‖ politics gave birth to an activist, grass-roots culture,
animated by the belief that another world was possible. 42 Through sophisticated
organizational techniques, this culture was able to change the nature of representative
democracy by taking the power out of the hands of corporations and placing it in the hands of
the people. This transition naturally faced fierce resistance from the economic elite, who had
grown accustomed to getting their own way. But the tide of participatory democracy proved
to be unstoppable. As corporate influence over governments faded, new space opened up
within Western democracies, and elsewhere, for radical political reform.43
Of course, the mere possibility of radical political reform did not guarantee that
anything much would change, nor, if change were to come about, did it imply a particular
direction. But when democratic processes are functioning sufficiently well, changes to the
legal and political structure of a society tend to reflect cultural values, like a ―magic mirror,‖
to revive Kermit Hall’s old metaphor.44 This notion that ―law reflects culture‖ leads us to the
second major reason, mentioned earlier, for the demise of growth politics in the West—
38
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namely, the radical transformation in attitudes toward personal consumption that occurred
during the second and third decades of this century.
The legal and political structures of growth capitalism ultimately depended upon a
culture of consumption, that is, upon a populace driven by an insatiable craving for more
consumer goods and services. 45 Though such commodity fetishism was observable in
Western societies almost from the onset of industrialization, it was really in the decades after
the Second World War (during the era sometimes referred to as ―postmodernity‖) when
consumption became a truly acute and debilitating social practice. 46 A collective
psychological disorder by our standards, commodity fetishism reached its zenith at the
beginning of this century, establishing a materialistic culture without any sense of sufficiency.
For reasons we still do not wholly understand, life in postmodernity was structured around
the pursuit of luxuries and comforts merely, and no matter how rich people became, it never
seemed to be enough.47
Unsurprisingly, during this era the West entered a phase of social decay.48 Despite
unprecedented levels of material wealth and sophisticated technologies, most Westerners
during these times were working longer hours than they had in the past,49 and aside from
working and sleeping, Westerners generally spent more time watching television than doing
anything else. 50 The division of labor reached an extreme, which may have efficiently
maximized economic growth, but it also meant that people became wholly dependent on the
market and thus were locked upon a consumerist treadmill that had no end and attained no
lasting satisfaction.51 Furthermore, urban sprawl led to highly artificial living environments
that disconnected people from a community of neighbors and from any real engagement with
nature. 52 This was the culture that transnational corporations celebrated as the ultimate
fulfilment of human destiny, the peak of civilization.
So long as most people felt that a higher material ―standard of living‖ was needed to
increase ―quality of life,‖ growth capitalism was politically safe.53 However, what is kept
alive by the citizenry can also, through a change in consciousness, be transformed by it. This
subversive thesis was famously advanced during the counter-cultural movements of the
1960s and 1970s, and was neatly captured in their slogan ―revolution by consciousness.‖54
But it was not until the so-called ―New Generation‖ counter-cultural movements of the 2010s
and early-to-mid-2020s did a ―revolution by consciousness‖ genuinely threaten to become a
45
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socio-political reality. Of those counter-cultural movements, one in particular—which came
to be known as the Voluntary Simplicity Movement55—deserves our immediate attention, as
it undermined growth capitalism and consumer culture most directly. Its unexpected
emergence and impact remains a subject of fascination amongst cultural historians, even if
the radical ideas upon which it was based seem rather mundane in an age, such as our own,
that accepts them unquestioningly as expressing the plainest commonsense. Let our
examination, then, be brief.
The emergence of the Voluntary Simplicity Movement was inextricably intertwined
with the rise of grass-roots politics, which we have seen was a reaction against the
undemocratic influence corporations had on ―political representatives.‖ But it was not
enough simply to wrestle political power from corporations; the grass-roots culture had to
know what to do with power should it succeed in attaining it, and thus it needed a guiding
philosophy. Furthermore, because the grass-roots culture upheld ―personal action‖ as the
means to social and political transformation, people realized that they needed to seriously
explore, en mass, ways they could oppose growth capitalism in their daily lives. An
attractive, meaningful, and coherent philosophy of living was found in the theory and practice
of voluntary simplicity. Before proceeding, it may be helpful to present a short statement of
this philosophy: first, so that we appreciate its stark contrast with consumerism, and second,
to make explicit the ethics of consumption that came to inform the (soon-to-be-considered)
politics beyond growth economics.
The following definition serves our purposes. It is taken from the introduction to an
early anthology on voluntary simplicity, published ninety years ago at the height of consumer
culture:
Voluntary simplicity is a post-consumerist living strategy that rejects
that materialistic lifestyles of consumer culture and affirms what is often just
called ―the simple life,‖ or ―downshifting.‖ The rejection of consumerism
arises out of the recognition that ordinary Western-style consumption habits
are destroying the planet; that lives of high consumption are unethical in a
world of great human need; and that the meaning of life does not and cannot
consist in the consumption and accumulation of material things. Extravagance
and acquisitiveness are thus considered a despairing waste of life, not so much
sad as foolish, and certainly not deserving of the social status and admiration
that they seem to attractive today. The affirmation of simplicity arises out of
the recognition that very little is needed to live well—that abundance is a state
of mind, not a quantity of consumer products or attainable through them.
Sometimes called ―the quiet revolution,‖ this approach to life involves
providing for material needs as simply and directly as possible, minimizing
expenditure on consumer goods and services, and directing progressively more
time and energy toward pursuing non-materialistic sources of satisfaction and
meaning. This generally means accepting a lower income and a lower level of
consumption, in exchange for more time and energy to pursue other life goals,
such as community or social engagements, family time, artistic or intellectual
projects, more fulfilling employment, political participation, sustainable living,
55
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spiritual exploration, reading, conversation, contemplation, relaxation,
pleasure-seeking, love, and so on—none of which need to rely on money, or
much money. The grounding assumption of voluntary simplicity is that
human beings are inherently capable of living meaningful, free, happy, and
infinitely diverse lives, while consuming no more than an equitable share of
nature. Ancient but ever-new, the message is that those who know they have
enough are rich.
According to this view, personal and social progress is measured not
by the conspicuous display of wealth or status, but by increases in the
qualitative richness of daily living, the cultivation of relationships, and the
development of social, intellectual, aesthetic, and spiritual potentials. As
Duane Elgin has famously defined it, voluntary simplicity is ―a manner of
living that is outwardly simple and inwardly rich, . . . a deliberate choice to
live with less in the belief that more life will be returned to us in the process.‖
Voluntary simplicity does not, however, mean living in poverty,
becoming an ascetic monk, or indiscriminately renouncing all the advantages
of science and technology. It does not involve regressing to a primitive state
or becoming a self-righteous puritan. And it is not some escapist fad reserved
for saints, hippies, or eccentric outsiders. Rather, by examining afresh our
relationship with money, material possessions, the planet, ourselves and each
other, the simple life of voluntary simplicity is about discovering the freedom
and contentment that comes with knowing how much consumption is truly
―enough.‖ And this might be a theme that has something to say to everyone,
especially those of us who are every day bombarded with thousands of cultural
and institutional messages insisting that ―more is always better.‖ Voluntary
simplicity is an art of living that is aglow with the insight that ―just enough is
plenty.‖
The spirit of late capitalist society, however, cries out like a banshee
for us to expend our lives pursuing middle-class luxuries and coloured paper,
for us to become faceless bodies dedicated to no higher purpose than the
acquisition of ―nice things.‖ We can embrace that comfortable unfreedom if
we wish, that bourgeois compromise. But it is not the only way to live.
Voluntary simplicity presents an alternative.56
Of course, this ―art of living‖ was not by any means new. The virtues of moderation
and enlightened material restraint had been integral to almost all ancient wisdom and spiritual
traditions, with prominent advocates including Lao Tzu, Confucius, Buddha, the Stoics, Jesus,
Mohammad, St. Francis, the Quakers, John Ruskin, the New England Transcendentalists
(especially Henry David Thoreau), Gandhi, Richard Gregg, and many of the indigenous
peoples around the world. 57 But in postmodernity, when consumption was glorified and
luxury admired as never before, voluntary simplicity acquired a special significance.
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Exactly why the Voluntary Simplicity Movement became a powerful oppositional
force in the second and third decades of this century remains something of a mystery, as
noted above. Few saw it coming or even recognized the signs of its emergence until it had
already arrived. Notions of simplicity spread, here and there, person to person, community to
community, as if by means invisible. Perhaps the idea just gave people hope? The
Movement had no leader, as such, though it developed strong social networks. It received
almost no support from mass media. Even politicians, despite their rhetoric of sustainability,
were reticent to promote simplicity for fear that widespread reductions in personal
consumption would slow economic growth. But still the light of simplicity began to dawn
gradually over the whole.
Perhaps Theodore Roszack, writing in the depths of consumer culture, was the most
prescient:
There is one way forward: the creation of flesh-and-blood examples of lowconsumption, high-quality alternatives to the mainstream pattern of life. This
we can see happening already on the counter cultural fringes. And nothing—
no amount of argument or research—will take the place of such living proof.
What people must see is that ecologically sane, socially responsible living is
good living; that simplicity, thrift, and reciprocity make for an existence that is
free.58
In the end, the nature of any society is shaped primarily by the countless number of
small decisions made by private individuals. 59 With respect to the Voluntary Simplicity
Movement, those small decisions, those small acts of simplification—insignificant though
they may have seemed in isolation—were ultimately of revolutionary significance when
added up and taken as a whole. But this ―quiet revolution,‖ as it came to be known, was not
like revolutions of the past. It originated with the individual and with culture. It did not need
violence to succeed, and it could not have been successfully resisted by violence. And it
changed the politico-legal structure only as its final act.60
III. POLITICIZING THE ECONOMY: THE EMERGENCE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY
By the end of the 2020s, the Voluntary Simplicity Movement had become a
significant oppositional force, and it would continue to strengthen and expand every year.
Though it had not, at this stage, achieved the cultural paradigm shift it sought, and though its
political impact had so far been quite modest, the line between counter-culture and
mainstream had certainly blurred, which is always a sign of great social transition. Within
large sectors of Western societies attitudes to consumption changed drastically. Luxurious
and extravagant lifestyles, once almost universally admired and envied, had come to be seen
by many as tasteless ostentation, improper in an age of ecological crisis and great human
need, and certainly not a reliable path to personal well-being.61 Furthermore, simple living
had become a socially accepted alternative lifestyle, which made stepping out of the
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mainstream much less isolating, thus hastening the demise of consumer culture. All this had
discernable social and ecological benefits.62
Nevertheless, despite significant cultural transformation in attitudes to consumption,
around this time many within the Voluntary Simplicity Movement came to a troubling
realization. It was becoming apparent that even those who genuinely wished to embrace
voluntary simplicity as an oppositional living strategy were finding the practice of simplicity
extremely challenging, especially in urban centers.63 Put otherwise, it seemed that political
and economic institutions, and social infrastructure, were functioning to lock many people
into high-impact consumerist lifestyles, despite their desire for a simpler way of life. 64 There
had, of course, always been an undercurrent within the Voluntary Simplicity Movement that
insisted that personal action alone was never going to be enough to achieve sustainability and
social justice—that political engagement was necessary. But few had appreciated quite how
hard it would be to create a simpler form of life from within an institutional framework based
on materialistic values. By the late 2020s, however, it had become obvious to all that the
socio-cultural movement away from consumerism needed to be supplemented and facilitated
by a politico-legal movement away from growth economics, and that latter transition is the
one to which we must now turn our attention.
Before we review the specific structural reforms that resulted from the gradual
politicization of the Voluntary Simplicity Movement, there is a somewhat abstract matter in
political and legal theory that ought to be addressed, albeit briefly. It concerns the nature of
property rights and the ways in which property rights were perceived to limit state power.
We must not forget, after all, that in the first half of the 21st Century, ―neoliberalism‖ was the
dominant political ideology, one of the central assumptions of which was that, prima facie,
the state had no right to interfere in the economy.65 This assumption had certain problematic
implications for those seeking political reform. Let us consider those implications, for
together they represent the last major obstacle that had to be overcome on the path to
revolutionary reform.
When participants in the Voluntary Simplicity Movement first began seriously
advocating political reform of the economy, they faced three fundamental objections arising
out of neoliberal ideology: 1) that the reforms advocated would result in a property system
that was no longer a private property system (and, if true, this was widely considered to be a
knock-down argument, politically speaking); 2) that the reforms, by interfering in the
property system, would violate the liberally revered ―private sphere‖ into which the state
purportedly had no right to enter; and 3) that the reforms would arbitrarily interfere with the
natural result of voluntary transactions made within the neutral and non-coercive ―free
market‖ system.
These objections were not new and, indeed, they had been fairly well answered in the
20th Century by other progressive intellectual movements such as Legal Realism, Critical
Legal Studies, and Social Relations Theory. 66 Accordingly, the Voluntary Simplicity
Movement did not really need to develop new intellectual tools to respond to those objections,
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but it certainly needed to, and did, campaign laboriously to weaken the hold neoliberalism
had on the popular consciousness. The following excerpt is taken from an anonymous
political pamphlet distributed by the Voluntary Simplicity Movement during its influential
internet campaign of 2034-5. It is quoted at some length because it responds, quite directly,
to the three objections stated above:
Our detractors rely on an ―essentialist‖ view of property. They assume
that there is a concept of property that, in fact, is the right one or the only one;
that there is a conception of property that is the concept of property. But the
indeterminacy critique has thoroughly discredited any such claim to
essentialism. The ―bundle of rights‖ conception of property, in particular,
though it is hardly a complete or uncontroversial picture, has shown that we
cannot say that person owns a resource if and only if that person has certain
specified rights, powers, liberties, and duties.67 In other words, the concept of
property is one that has many conceptions.68 This means that private property
can take the shape of many different ―bundles,‖ and so it should not be
conceived of as a fixed, static, or homogenous category, especially since each
―bundle‖ can be disaggregated into isolated ―sticks.‖ Furthermore, the
―sticks‖ themselves—such as the ―right to use,‖ the ―right to exclude,‖ the
―right to transfer,‖ or the ―duty not to harm‖—are far from absolute or selfdefining.69
This, in short, is the great legacy of Legal Realism to which essentialist
and absolutist property theorists have never developed a satisfactory
response. 70 It is also the legacy upon which our Politics of Entropia are
founded, for it promisingly demonstrates that there can be private
property/market systems that are radically different from growth capitalism as
we know it, since ―private property‖ does not mean one thing, and neither
does ―the market.‖ Another property system is possible.
Our detractors also claim that our political agenda would involve
illegitimate state interference in the property and market system. But this
objection is analytically outdated. Critical Legal Studies (CLS) showed long
ago that for property and property-related concepts (such as ownership, harm,
rights, wealth, efficiency, free contract, duress, justice, and so on) to become
concrete conceptions in legal reality, state institutions must be always and
necessarily involved in defining property rights and market structures. 71 One
consequence of this is that the neoliberal demand for state ―non-intervention‖
67
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in the so-called ―private economic sphere‖—where property rights are said to
be sacrosanct and self-regulating—is an impossible one, and transparently so.
The state is necessarily implicated in the economy because (among other
things) it must: a) provide details on which incidents of ownership will form
the ―bundle,‖ what each incident entails, and in which circumstances; b)
define the idea of ―freedom of contract,‖ since it too is not self-defining; c) set
other ―ground-rules‖ to the economy (such as, ―What can be property?‖;
―What kind of entities can be agents in the market?‖; and ―What happens
when property rights conflict?‖); and d) enforce the property rights created by
a), b), and c). As one critical theorist noted, ―The question is not whether to
regulate owners; the question is what kind of property system to create in the
first place.‖72 ―Hands off‖ is simply not an option.
This critique of the private/public distinction exposes how often the
distinction between the ―free market‖ and ―regulatory systems‖ breaks down,
a point another theorist has expressed in the following way: ―There is no
nonarbitrary way to differentiate the law constituting a market, from the law
supposedly regulating or intervening in the market.‖ 73 This critique is
significant because it answers the neoliberal lament that property rights are
violated whenever the state ―interferes‖ in the economy. Again, the state is
necessarily implicated in the economy, and so reformers are entitled to
question whether society may be better off if the state implicates itself in
different ways and on a different basis. What is clear is that this reformist
approach—which may include ―revolutionary reform‖—cannot be dismissed
in advance on the basis of an essentialist view of ―private property‖ or ―the
market,‖ or on the basis that the state ought to stay out of the ―private
economic sphere,‖ since both essentialism and the private/public distinction
clearly lie in ruins.
Some detractors within the positivist tradition, however, accept that the
state is indeed required to define the legal rules governing market transfers,
private property, and voluntary contracting—since they are not self-defining—
but argue that the rules set up by the state must be neutral.74 Legal rules that
are neutral, the argument goes, would simply facilitate the voluntary exchange
of private property rights in a free market, and thereby allow individuals to
pursue their own preferences and visions of the good life without having the
state impose its preferences or values upon them. Regulators and reformers,
according this view, are seen as politically biased people who try to use state
apparatus to impose their own subjective preferences and values on others, and
who try to bring about a distribution of wealth and power other than that
which naturally results when individuals voluntarily exchange property rights
in a free market.
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The indeterminacy critique, however, renders this neoliberal view
incoherent also. As outlined above, the state is required to make all sorts of
definitional choices about what the abstract property and property-related
concepts mean in economic reality, and these choices have significant
implications for what type of society results. What CLS made perfectly clear,
however, is that these choices can never be neutral—first, because there is no
objective or apolitical standpoint from where those choices could be made,
and second, because such choices always allocate wealth and power between
individuals and groups in society.75 For these reasons it is wrong to disclaim
all responsibility for the social and environmental consequences of those
allocations and blithely say that they are the natural result of free choices
made within a neutral and non-coercive market framework.76 To stress the socalled neutrality of the ―free market,‖ and to deny that political, value-laden,
choices inevitably go into its formation, is ideological.77 It is a perspective
that deflects attention away from the political choices benefiting some
individuals, groups, and interests at the expense of others, and it unduly limits
what reformative options appear democratically available. It can make the
existing property regime (including its concentrations of wealth and structures
of power) seem ―natural‖ or ―right or ―just the way the world is,‖ when in fact
that regime is a contingent creation of our choosing, which we have made, and
which can be democratically remade.
The choice is ours, if we choose it.78
The fundamental point here—a rather obvious one to us—is that property rights are
not static or determinate entities which exist independently of the state, but are evolving and
highly malleable creatures of legal convention. It follows that property rights are also
inescapably value-laden and context-dependent, meaning that their legitimacy must be
periodically reassessed as society or the environment changes. Indeed, the greater the
changes in context, the greater the need for the reassessment, and perhaps revision, of
property rights. These ideas, as they came to be widely understood and accepted, functioned
to radicalize Western democracies by politicizing the economy. It was this shift in political
consciousness which allowed democratic citizens to see that they had the right and the power
to design (or redesign) the economic framework within which they live their lives, an insight
which neoliberal ideology had repressed for far too long.
During this time, as noted above, the Voluntary Simplicity Movement was entering
the cultural mainstream and beginning to demand some political recognition—sounding the
death knell for growth capitalism. Attitudes to consumption had undergone a huge shift
toward material simplicity, and the time was ripe for the political manifestation of this new
sensibility. Furthermore, by this stage the myriad problems of social and ecological overconsumption had intensified, meaning that a political response could no longer be delayed.
The Voluntary Simplicity Movement did not waste this opportunity to call for a politics of
sustainable consumption, a politics beyond growth economics. And, at last, the call did not
fall on deaf ears.
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The world was ready for change.
IV. A RADICAL POLITICS OF PROPERTY BEYOND GROWTH ECONOMICS
What follows is a review of the matrix of ―revolutionary reforms‖ which resulted
from the gradual politicization of the Voluntary Simplicity Movement in Western societies
over the course of the 21st Century.79 Obviously, different nations evolved in different ways,
at different times, and these differences were sometimes considerable. Indeed, throughout
the Great Transition an openness to plurality was, and still is, considered a virtue.
Nevertheless, if we look at the world at the beginning of this century and compare it with
how it is at the end, it cannot be denied that there has been a recognizable and coherent
paradigm shift in law, politics, and economics, especially with respect to Western-style
systems of property. In what follows an attempt is made to outline, with a very broad brush,
the most significant features of the new paradigm, beginning with the new indicators of
progress which were so instrumental in deposing growth economics. Deferring to convention,
this new paradigm will be referred to as ―Entropia,‖ which is not a place, as such, so much as
it is the idealized social, economic, and political order which guided and motivated many of
the radical law reform movements during this century.
A. Beyond GDP: Alternative Indicators of Progress
We saw earlier that during the era of growth capitalism, increasing GDP was the
overriding objective of governments.80 It was an era when economists, policymakers, judges,
reporters, and the wider public generally relied on GDP as a shorthand indicator of a nation’s
progress (―the growth model of progress‖). But GDP is merely a sum of national spending
which makes no distinctions between transactions that add to well-being and those that
diminish it; it does not take any account of ecological damage or wealth distribution; and
anything that is not recorded as a market transaction is excluded from its accounts, such as
domestic work, volunteering, and leisure.81 For these reasons, among others, GDP is a highly
defective measure of how well-off a society is and a poor indicator of policy and institutional
success. 82 When this was eventually recognized and exposed, scholars began developing
alternative, much more nuanced, measures of societal progress.83 One such measure, which
has gradually received official recognition and respect, is known as the Genuine Progress
79
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Indicator (GPI).84 Arguably, this development symbolizes better than any other the transition
from growth capitalism to Entropia.
The ―extended accounts‖ of the GPI begin with total private consumption expenditure
and then make reductions for things such as poverty, polarized income distribution, crime,
resource depletion, pollution, environmental damage, and so on, and additions for things such
as domestic work, volunteering, increases in leisure, public infrastructure, and the like.85 The
aim is to measure, as accurately as possible, the ―genuine progress‖ of a society, not simply
the growth of its GDP. 86 Although the GPI remains an imperfect tool, and so must be
employed cautiously and tentatively, the significance of it replacing GDP as a measure of
progress can hardly be overstated. In essence, public support of the GPI means that political
parties can campaign for policy and institutional reforms that are likely to genuinely improve
well-being, even if those reforms would slow or even reduce economic growth. Once upon a
time, of course, implementing reforms that would negatively affect growth rates was
tantamount to committing political suicide. But by distinguishing genuine progress from
economic growth, that changed. In particular, new space opened up within the political arena
for the following legal reforms in property relations.
B. Basic Income As a New Property Right
One of the deepest and most enduring criticisms levelled at capitalist societies was
that, no matter how rich they became, there always remained an underclass of people who
were unemployed and poverty-stricken. To permit members of an affluent society to live
without any secure livelihood seems to us to be an evident moral abomination, but majority
opinion among earlier generations took it to be regrettable but permissible, perhaps even
necessary.87 Even strong varieties of the ―welfare state‖ were unable to provide all with the
economic security which we regard as necessary to live a fully human life of freedom and
dignity, because welfare payments could be denied, delayed, or revoked, for any number of
reasons. The politics of Entropia boldly confronted this serious problem with remarkable
directness, by gradually introducing what is called a ―Basic Income System,‖ otherwise
known as a ―Simplicity Entitlement.‖88
Although there is considerable variety in forms of Basic Income, the core idea is
relatively straightforward. In its idealized form, every permanent resident would receive a
periodic (e.g. fortnightly) stipend sufficient to live at a culturally defined minimal standard of
economic security, generally at a level marginally above the culturally specific ―poverty line‖;
that is, enough to live simply, securely, and with dignity, though, as two commentators put it,
―extremely modestly.‖89 The Basic Income is guaranteed by the state, is unconditional on the
performance of any labor, and is universal (excepting only those incarcerated). Parents are
84
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the custodians of children’s grants (which are typically somewhat lower than adult grants).
Within a fully developed Basic Income System most other state transfers can be abolished—
unemployment benefits, family allowances, pensions, and so on—because the Basic Income
grant is sufficient to provide everyone with a decent, though minimal, subsistence. Economic
insecurity, whether from incapacity or unemployment, is therefore essentially eliminated.
Even minimum wage laws can be somewhat relaxed, because all earning above the Basic
Income is discretionary. Other kinds of programs remain, such as subsidies for people with
special needs, as do universalistic programs, such as public education and health care. 90 In
many jurisdictions, the Basic Income entitlement is increasingly being described as a ―new‖
property right.91
The feasibility of a Basic Income System was historically doubted for two main reasons.
The first objection was that making the Basic Income unconditional on the performance of
any labor would give rise to a society of ―free-riders‖ and ultimately lead to economic
collapse. This pessimistic outlook, however, has been proven unjustified. Few would be
surprised to hear that the ―free-rider‖ problem does exist to a certain extent today—that is,
there are indeed some who live off the Basic Income but who choose not to contribute to
society in any discernable way. However, it turns out that human beings, by and large, are
social creatures, who find being engaged in their community’s work more meaningful and
fulfilling than being isolated, idle, and parasitic on the community. Furthermore, the very
small minority that choose not to contribute in any way prove to be a tolerable burden—
certainly more tolerable than the levels of poverty which persisted within the property
systems of late capitalism. A large majority of citizens remain in some form of paid
employment, and the percentage that do not are typically engaged in other forms of socially
necessary and beneficial work, such as raising children, working in community gardens or
local energy centers, volunteering at the esteemed and well-organized Centers for Social
Service, or exchanging labor for housing through the Organization for Affordable and
Sustainable Housing.92
The second objection concerned the feasibility of financing a Basic Income System,
an issue which is obviously of great importance, although it was and remains a matter of
political commitment more than a financing issue. Basic Income entitlements did create a
new and significant financial burden on the public purse; however, changes to public
spending as well as significant tax reforms93 have been sufficient, in many of the wealthier
jurisdictions, at least, to gradually raise the Basic Income to a minimal level of dignified
subsistence. Those jurisdictions around the globe which are still transitioning toward a
subsistence-level Basic Income System are often called ―Guaranteed Income Systems‖
(which guarantee a certain level of income, but below subsistence levels, meaning that some
supplementary income is still necessary through earnings). Another method several nations
have used to progress toward a Basic Income System is to establish a Negative Income Tax
System, which differs from a Basic Income in that it provides a tax credit (typically
beginning at low levels and increasing over time) to those with low incomes, providing such
90
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low-earners with a minimum income but by an alternative route. 94 These approaches of
incrementally raising the level of Guaranteed Income or Negative Income Tax to establish a
fully developed system of Basic Income were key both to the financial viability and the
political attractiveness of the Basic Income policy objective.
It is worth noting that a Basic Income System or one of its varieties does tend to slow
growth in the economies in which they operate, for the reason that such systems—consonant
with the predictions of orthodox economic theory—inevitably provide fewer incentives for
citizens to dedicate so much of their energy to productive activity. But because the wealthiest
nations today are no longer anxious to grow, and many are even voluntarily transitioning by
way of degrowth to a steady-state economy,95 the whole question of maximizing incentives is
much less pressing. Indeed, the level at which governments set a Basic or Guaranteed
Income can be a device to control, to a certain extent, the level of growth/degrowth in an
economy.
The social benefits of the Basic Income were profound and far-reaching. Beyond
eliminating poverty and economic insecurity—which were the primary functions of a Basic
Income System—its gradual institution also strengthened the bargaining position of workers,
because it gave them a livelihood that was independent of their paid employment and thus
more power to demand decent working conditions. It also meant that people did not have to
accept alienating, exploitative, or degrading jobs just to survive; nor was there any real
pressure to sacrifice social and political autonomy in order to achieve economic security. 96
Furthermore, introducing the Basic Income was effectively an acknowledgement of the worth
of unpaid caring work and other forms of social contribution, thereby extending economic
citizenship beyond participants in the traditional labor market.97 For these reasons, among
others, the legal restructuring of property relations based upon the notion of Basic Income has
done much to create more democratic and egalitarian societies. By structurally promoting
―simple living,‖ the Basic Income has also had ecological benefits.98
C. Progressive Income Tax and the Maximum Wage
In general, the property systems of Entropia are shaped by highly progressive income
or consumption taxes which fund a considerable portion of the state’s policies, including the
Basic Income entitlement.99 Progressive forms of taxation were in place even within the
paradigm of growth capitalism, so there is little need to address the matter of justification in
any detail. Put simply, progressive taxation is justified primarily on the dual grounds of
equity and utility. That is, because it is equitable for the richest to pay more than the poorest
to fund the state’s policies, and because the diminishing marginal utility of money means that
94
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the more money one has, the less utility or happiness one can buy with each further dollar
(i.e., one dollar is more valuable to a poor person than to a rich person), some redistribution is
an efficient use of resources. What distinguished the politics of Entropia from growth
capitalism was how progressive taxation was used to effectively create a ―maximum wage‖
or ―income cap.‖100 Let us consider this central development.
Just as most at the beginning of the 20th Century had trouble imagining how their
ancestors could have stomached slavery, so we at the end of the 21st Century are dismayed
by the truly excessive incomes that some executives, managers, shareholders, doctors,
lawyers, and other professionals received not so long ago.101 We cannot understand why it
was ever permitted for some incomes to reach into the millions or tens of millions of dollars
when many workers—sometimes even those working in the same enterprise—received little
more than an (insecure) subsistence wage. We consider such disparities plainly objectionable
on many grounds: they undermine democracy and social solidarity, they encourage grossly
extravagant lifestyles, and they simply cannot be justified by any appeal to proportional merit
or social contribution.102 The politics of Entropia, of course, never advocated anything like
strict equality in incomes. Much inequality remains. However, it is widely taken for granted
today that some limits must be placed on individual incomes, and a simple restructure of
progressive income tax policy provided a straightforward method for doing so.
An income tax is ―progressive‖ when the tax rate increases as the taxable income
increases. In theory, at least, all income over a certain amount could be taxed completely,
thereby creating a ―maximum wage‖ or ―income cap.‖ Although only New Zealand’s
Remuneration Justice Act 2038 has actually gone this far, all of the Western economies have
gradually established a top income bracket which is taxed more than ninety percent (which,
strictly speaking, does not place any ―cap‖ as such on incomes, but functions in a similar
way).103 The income level of the top tax bracket also varies between nations—often starting
high, for political reasons, and then decreasing—but today it generally sits quite stably
around ten to fifteen times the level of the Basic Income.104
One may have thought that the introduction of such policies would have been
politically controversial in the extreme, given the history of limitless incomes, but it turned
out that this was not the case. Although there were certainly loud objections from advocates
of the ―free market,‖ various referenda were held which unambiguously demonstrated that
the policies had overwhelming public support, doubtless owing to the fact that the maximum
wage would only limit the incomes of a very small minority of people. Political
representatives, accordingly, had no choice but to follow the will of the people.
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D. Worker Cooperatives
Capitalist economic relations paradigmatically involved workers selling their labor to
the owners of productive assets and those owners then selling the commodities produced for
more than the cost of the labor that went into making them, thereby making a ―profit.‖ We
attribute to Karl Marx, more than any other, the thesis that this capitalist mode of production
and exchange exploits workers.105 It is exploitative, Marx argued, because workers are paid
less for their labor than the value of the commodities they produce. 106 The solution he
proposed was to abolish all private ownership of productive assets and replace it with state
ownership; that is, to replace capitalism with communism.107
Many involved in the politics of Entropia were sympathetic to (without wholly
subscribing to) the view that workers, to varying extents, were exploited under the capitalist
mode of production and its legal superstructure; yet, for various reasons, they did not see
state ownership of productive assets as the solution. Rather than state communism, what
emerged instead were various forms of ―market-socialist‖ property systems in which worker
cooperatives are increasingly the dominant economic form. These enterprises are owned by
their workers and democratically operated on a ―one person, one vote‖ basis, thereby
avoiding the exploitative relationships which Marx and others criticised so vehemently. 108
The cooperatives still fall within the private property paradigm, however, because workers
still have individual ownership interests in them, and the state does not determine what the
cooperatives produce. Furthermore, the economy is still based on market exchanges, because
cooperatives gain income by selling their goods and services to customers. In doing this,
they compete with other cooperatives (and other small businesses of the allowable types).
The primary difference with growth capitalism is that large corporate entities employing nonshareholders have largely disappeared.109
The transition to this type of ―stakeholder society‖ was facilitated both by public
policy and cultural changes, each promoting the other in a dialectical fashion. When
governments decided that broadening the ownership base of the economy was to be a policy
goal, the first step in that direction was often to make the tax rates for worker cooperatives
extremely attractive compared to the tax rates for the traditional ―owner-shareholder‖
corporate entities. Governments also began explicitly preferring worker cooperatives when
contracting with the private sector, and whenever possible government spending was directed
toward worker cooperatives. Various types of development banks were also created through
which governments began funding new businesses which were required to establish
themselves as worker cooperatives. Collectively, these strategies, and many others, were able
to create fertile conditions in which worker cooperatives could take root, multiply, and
105
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flourish. It was arguably a shift in consumer attitudes, however, that was the deepest driver
of change. When private individuals began choosing to direct their expenditure toward
cooperative enterprises, the old corporate structures gradually withered away as a natural
consequence of market forces. This is a powerful reminder that how we spend our money is
how we vote on what exists in the world.110
The emergence of worker cooperatives has been one of the most significant
developments in the transition toward Entropia. It has expanded democratic decision-making
beyond representative politics to include the everyday realm of economics, giving people
much more control over their lives. Though democratizing the internal workings of business
enterprises has created new inefficiencies—e.g., decision-making can be slower—the fact
that workers now have a real stake in the businesses within which they work has also created
new forms of efficiency and fostered a new ethics of productivity and collective
responsibility. 111 The material rewards of production are also distributed more evenly,
though strict equality is rarely practiced (or expected). Beyond these appealing features,
worker cooperatives have also functioned to be more ecologically sensitive than the old
corporate forms, because businesses owned and managed by local citizens take more care
than ―absentee owners‖ to ensure business practices do not harm the environment.112 Finally,
cooperatives also seem to have engendered a greater sense of social solidarity and community,
as workers belong to and participate in stable associations of people with common interests
and a shared economic identity.113
E. Land Law and the Duty Not to Harm
Although all of the reforms described above had ecological benefits, more direct and
immediate legal and political action was needed to adequately confront the ecological crisis.
The difficulty here was the enduring influence of the neoliberal conception of property,
which resisted state regulation in the economy. 114 It was a remarkably simple question,
however, which gave rise to a radically new approach: Do property owners have the right to
use land in ecologically unsustainable ways? Although the response came dangerously late,
lawmakers eventually answered that question in the negative. Let us consider the general line
of argument.
To question whether a person or entity possesses a property right to engage in a
particular activity is to acknowledge, as we must, that property rights are not absolute but in
some sense always limited.115 Outdated imagery aside, ownership does not and cannot entail
110
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the right to ―do as one pleases‖ with the property one owns, for that would be plainly selfdefeating. It would allow others to use their property in ways that harmed one’s own
property or indeed oneself, and thus even the most hard-nosed libertarians have always
accepted that the ownership of property necessarily entails a ―duty not to harm.‖ 116 As
Hohfeld explained long ago, this ―duty not to harm‖ places limits on the ―right to use.‖117
One important consequence of this is that state regulation which prevents ―harmful
use‖ cannot be considered a violation of property rights, because property holders simply do
not have the right to harm others or the property of others. In other words, such preventative
action would not be ―taking‖ anything that owners ever held (or properly held), from which it
follows that in such circumstances no right to compensation could arise. What this means,
also, is that regulation of the property system which prevents ―harmful use‖ should not be
understood to be changing the prior regime, but only maintaining and enforcing the ―rightful
scope‖ of the prior regime in which the duty not to harm was always recognized.
This blurs the distinction between ―property‖ and ―regulation.‖ 118 Regulation is
normally conceived of as something that interferes with property rights. But when the state
intervenes in the property system to stop ―harmful use,‖ then such intervention is not so much
the regulation of property as it is the maintenance or protection of property. And this more
accurate reframing of the issue has been of rhetorical significance to ecological reformers,
especially in the first quarter of this century when ―regulation‖ was such a dirty word.
In the midst of the ecological crisis, when nothing less than Nature’s life-support
systems were at risk of collapsing, lawmakers realized that they needed to pay much more
attention to the duty of property holders not to cause ―harm.‖ Exactly what constitutes harm,
at any given time, is indeterminate and often contentious, of course, but that just means that it
is a concept that must be defined democratically, for the common good. As one pioneering
legal ecologist at the turn of the century noted, ―Harm . . . is an elastic, vague concept that we
can define in whatever way we deem wise. . . . By redefining harm we can [for example]
challenge and end land uses we don’t want.‖119 This theorist added, however, with an air of
caution, that ―government wields breathtaking power when it can define harm however it sees
fit.‖120 That was (and remains) true, but as Nature was being degraded as never before there
were far greater risks in the government not doing enough to enforce the ―duty not to harm‖
than there were in it doing too much.
As the problems of overconsumption, loss of biodiversity, and climate change
intensified, the meaning of the ―duty not to harm‖ inevitably expanded, narrowing the
rightful scope of property rights.121 By intervening in the property system to enforce this
―duty not to harm,‖ the state was not actually changing the prior regime, properly understood,
but only maintaining the ―rightful scope‖ of the prior regime in which the duty not to harm
was always recognized. Accordingly, such preventative action or maintenance was not
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―taking‖ anything that owners ever held (or properly held), from which it followed that in
such circumstances no right to compensation could arise.
To provide a famous, ground-breaking example of this approach, we need only note
the case of Australia, which, in 2025, was the first nation to pass legislation to the effect that
coal mining and the logging of old-growth forests were no longer acceptable uses of land, and
would be faded out (with minor exceptions). Unsurprisingly, powerful economic agents at
this time cried out piously about the alleged violation of their property rights; all the more so
when they received little or no compensation. But slave owners once cried out in the same
vein, and their claims to compensation were also properly ignored. In short, once lawmakers
decided that property law had been wrong to protect certain use rights, and that no such rights
did or should exist, it was considered contradictory to grant compensation as if the property
rights did exist after all. As the preamble to the Australian Land Ethics (Amendment) Act
2025 still reads: ―The government does not accept for compensation purposes the very
baseline that regulatory protection recognizes as wrongful.‖122
F. Inheritance and Bequest
Another key feature in the transition from growth capitalism to the politics of
Entropia was the revolutionary reforms that took place in relation to the laws of inheritance
and bequest. A few words will suffice to convey the essence of these changes and their
salutary effects.
Opposition to the laws of inheritance and bequest was as old as the laws
themselves.123 Allowing huge concentrations of wealth to be passed down a family line, from
generation to generation, was often criticized for being an inequitable relic of feudalism that
somehow survived the transition to capitalism. The overthrow of feudalism was driven, after
all, by distaste for the arbitrary birthright privileges (of wealth, status, and power) that were
bestowed upon the ―nobility.‖ Simultaneously, one of the bedrock principles of political
liberalism which shaped the post-feudal world was a commitment to ―equality of
opportunity,‖ that is, to the belief that success in life should be based as far as possible on
merit, not accident, chance, or caste. 124 Yet, despite entrenching arbitrary privileges and
keeping concentrations of wealth intact for reasons other than merit, the laws of inheritance
and bequest endured for hundreds of years after the transition to capitalism, almost as if they
were essential to a private property system.125
But essential they are not. Private property is a concept that has many conceptions.
According to one persistent conception (useful though incomplete), property is a ―bundle of
rights.‖ What is clear is that the ―bundle of rights‖ can be reconfigured, sometimes
significantly, while remaining a private property system, and over the last century private
property has indeed been significantly reconfigured. In various ways (discussed below), the
right to bequeath one’s property upon death has been disaggregated from the bundle of rights
associated with property ownership. And when that right goes, so too does any alleged right
of potential beneficiaries to inherit property. The politics of Entropia have shown not only
that there can be private property systems which do not recognize the right to bequeath or
122
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inherit property, but also that such revised systems better accord with the arguments (based
on freedom, justice, utility, security, and so on) used to justify private property in the first
place.126
Nevertheless, despite the conceptual possibility and normative attractiveness of a
private property system that does not recognize the rights of inheritance and bequest,
reconfiguring the ―bundle of rights‖ in that manner required political tact. Rather than an
outright abolition of those inheritance and bequest laws, in most jurisdictions it proved to be
politically more attractive to gradually increase inheritance taxes and gift taxes. In fact, even
today, bequest and inheritance are still technically recognized in most of the advanced
economies, where allowances are properly made for dependents (children, parents, and
grandparents who are in need of support), as well as certain other exceptions (such as limited
gifts to charities). But beyond providing for the essential needs of dependents, which is very
limited in our age of the Basic Income, and other minor exceptions, a citizen’s property upon
death is generally taxed in excess of ninety percent. This effectively (though not technically)
disaggregates the right of bequest from the bundle of rights associated with ownership. It is
perhaps surprising that only in England, where the roots of feudalism were deepest, have
inheritance and bequest been abolished outright. In that jurisdiction, a citizen’s property
upon death is now distributed by the Justice Tribunal, which was established in 2042.127 It is
a system that has acquired wide support. Whether other jurisdictions eventually follow the
English example remains to be seen.
Whether through taxation or outright abolition, disaggregating inheritance and
bequest from the institution of private property has been a landmark achievement on the path
to Entropia. Not only has it contributed greatly to the democratic ideals of equality of
opportunity in life and a broad-based distribution of wealth, it also provided (and still
provides) states around the world with the public resources necessary to adequately confront
the ecological crisis and adapt to climate change. In fact, many political parties, particularly
in Western Europe, campaigned for the reform of inheritance and bequest laws on the very
basis that the bulk of the new tax revenues would be directed toward environmental
initiatives. Indeed, it would be fair to say that the transition to clean and renewable energy
systems that we saw over the first half of this century was funded, to a large extent, by the
proceeds of the property and tax reforms related to inheritance and bequest.
G. Working Hours
The reforms outlined above represent the most significant structural changes that
occurred over the last century to Western-style property systems. Before concluding our
review of the paradigm shift, it is important to note one final revolutionary reform, this time
in labor law, which is considered central to the politics of Entropia.
Over the last century working hours in the West have dramatically decreased,
representing a culture-wide exchange of money for time. This was partly due to cultural
changes in attitudes to consumption (i.e., the less one consumes the less one needs to work to
support one’s lifestyle), but it was also facilitated by structural changes. Economic theory
posits that actors in an economy should be free to maximize their happiness (or ―utility‖) by
selling as much or as little of their time (or ―labor-power‖) as they want.128 Under growth
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capitalism, however, there were structural biases that functioned to promote over-work (i.e.,
working hours that were not ―optimal‖ or ―utility maximizing‖), such as laws which treated
the forty-hour work week as ―standard‖ and which excluded part-time workers from many of
the non-pecuniary benefits enjoyed by those who work full-time. The effect of these
structural biases was essentially to force many people to work longer hours than they wanted
or needed to, which gave rise to cultures that tended to over-consume resources and underconsume leisure.129 This led to higher GDP per capita, of course, but often at the cost of
quality of life, and the planet.130
During the 21st Century, led by Western European nations, many jurisdictions first
introduced the thirty-five-hour work week, then the twenty-eight-hour work week, and in
places even the twenty-one-hour work week.131 In a progressive response to pressures arising
from the GFC, the U.S. state of Utah, for example, shifted to a four-day work week for all
public employees. Almost immediately it was reported that the resulting pattern of work
reduction led to ―significant environmental benefits, with reduced transport and energy
costs.‖ 132 Furthermore, the extra day off also led to a ―dramatic increase in community
volunteering.‖133 Many governments around the world have shown leadership in this regard,
by down-shifting most government positions to a reduced work week and by providing tax
incentives to private employers which do the same.
As well as reducing the standard work week, labor laws have also been broadly
reformed to better protect those in part-time employment and those who wish to job-share. In
many places these policies have gone a long way to eliminating unemployment (because
labor is systematically spread); furthermore, the increase in leisure has resulted in many other
social and ecological benefits, including healthier and happier populations with more time to
pursue their private passions and enjoy their civic responsibilities, and with lower ecological
footprints (because they are consuming and travelling less). 134 The Working Hours
Adjustment Act 2000 in The Netherlands is representative of the structural changes which
occurred in this regard. This path-breaking act allowed workers to reduce their hours to parttime simply by asking their employers.135 As explained by pioneering work reductionist John
de Graaf:
Unless there is a clear hardship for the firm—something shown in less than
5% of cases—the employer must grant the reduction in hours. Workers keep
the same hourly salary, full health-care, and pro-rata additional benefits like
vacation time and pensions. This law, in the most concrete terms, allows
workers to trade money for time, without losing their jobs or healthcare. As a
result, more than a third of Dutch employees work part-time, the highest ratio
in the world.136
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Those who complained that these work policies would not maximize GDP per capita
were obviously missing the point. The point of an economy is to efficiently promote quality
of life, and if a smaller economy promotes quality of life by providing increased leisure but
less money for its participants, then a smaller economy is the most economically rational
option to choose. In a word, this is the rationality of degrowth.137
V. CONCLUSION: THE LAW OF PROGRESSIVE SIMPLIFICATION
According to Arnold Toynbee’s ―Law of Progressive Simplification,‖ 138 as a
civilization evolves it will come to transfer increasing increments of energy and attention
from the material (money and possessions) to the non-material side of life (relationships,
contemplation, community, art, and so on). If we accept this aspect of Toynbee’s conception
of history, which posits simplicity of living as the peak of civilization, then ours has
ultimately been a century of progress. As Toynbee and others predicted, nature compelled us
to revert to a stable state on the material plane and thus we found ourselves forced to turn to
the realm of the spirit to satisfy our hunger for infinity. As the dust settles upon the path we
have travelled this century, we look back and gain a new prospect of the world and our place
in it. When placed in the context of history, the changes we have seen have surely been as
great as the transition from feudalism to capitalism.
If there is one lesson that humanity will take from this difficult century, it will be that
legal and political reforms in property relations which slow or even have a negative impact
on growth, and which thereby lower ―standard of living‖ (measured by per capita income),
can actually increase ―quality of life‖ (measured by subjective well-being). Put otherwise,
the lesson is that lower productivity is a small price to pay for unprecedented well-being, the
advancement of distributive justice, and enhanced ecological conditions. Looking back we
see how easy it would have been to avoid so much suffering and destruction had we only
realized this earlier, or, rather, had we only acted earlier upon that which we knew very well.
Of course, despite huge advances, our world today is far from perfect. Global poverty
has not been eradicated and it is probably too early to claim that the ecological crisis is over.
In particular, we will still need to adapt as the climate changes further, and the countless
tonnes of carbon deposited in the atmosphere by earlier generations may still have
unforeseeable impacts on global ecosystems. But genuine and significant progress has
unquestionably been made. Far from signifying the end of history, however, it is clear that
this moment in time, like every moment, is simply the beginning of the future. And that is
the challenge which confronts us, which has always confronted us.
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